USS Indianapolis (CA-35)

On July 30, 1945, the USS Indianapolis was torpedoed by the Imperial Japanese Navy, sinking in 12 minutes halfway between Guam and the Philippines in shark-filled waters. Of the 1196 crewmen aboard, 880 survived the sinking, but only 321 came out of the water alive; only 317 ultimately survived the 4 days in the water facing exposure, dehydration, saltwater poisoning and shark attacks.

The USS Indianapolis left San Francisco on July 16, 1945. She had been at Mare Island Navy Yard to get heavy underwater damage repaired from a Kamikaze attack in the Battle of Okinawa in March. Next, she was ordered to the former Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, on a secret mission to carry parts and enriched uranium for the atomic bomb Little Boy (the gun-type fission weapon which would later be dropped on Hiroshima). She arrived at Pearl Harbor on July 19, then continued on to Tinian, arriving on July 26 to deliver her cargo. After returning to Guam, she was to meet up with the USS Idaho in the Leyte Gulf. Unfortunately, she never made it.

USS Indianapolis National Memorial

The USS Indianapolis National Memorial commemorates those who served as well as lost their lives on her. The memorial is on the east bank of the Central Canal and can be easily visited, open to the public 24 hours a day. The north side of the monument (above) tells the story of the USS Indianapolis and the disaster that the crewmen suffered. On the south side are the names of the ship’s company who made up her final crew.

The fate of the USS Indianapolis wasn’t known to the country until V-J Day, when it was reported in American newspapers along with the Japanese surrender.

Newspapers reporting on the USS Indianapolis sinking.

For further reading:

• USS Indianapolis Leaves in Mystery Cloak. The Daily Chronicles of World War II. (ww2days.com)
• The Sinking of USS Indianapolis (Recollections of Captain charles B. McVay, III, USN, Commanding Officer of USS Indianapolis [CA-35] which was sunk by Japanese submarine I-58 on 30 July 1945 near the Philippines). ehistory. The Ohio State University
• Finneran, P.J. (1994). The Tragedy of the USS Indianapolis (CA-35). ussindianapolis.org.
• USS Indianapolis Museum. ussindianapolis.us
• LaGrone, S. (2016, July 27). New Lead Uncovered in Search for USS Indianapolis. USNI News, a publication of the U.S. Naval Insitute.
• Cruiser Sunk, 1,196 Casualties; Took Atom Bomb Cargo to Guam. (1945, August 14). New York Times.

Major General Leslie Groves

Brigadier General Thomas Farrell

On June 29, 1946, the Manhattan Engineer District published their report, The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, describing the effects of the atomic bombs. The report was compiled under the direction of Major General Leslie Groves, who instructed Brigadier General Thomas Farrell to organize a special Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group. Their mission was to secure scientific, technical, and medical intelligence about the atomic bomb effects from Hiroshima and Nagasaki as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities.

Brigadier General James Newman

Dr. Masao Tsuzuki

Dr. Stafford L. Warren

Farrell arrived in Hiroshima on September 8, 1946, equipped with portable geiger counters. Along with Brigadier General James Newman, Dr. Masao Tsuzuki (member of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission also acting as translator), and Colonel Stafford Warren, the head of the Manhattan District’s Medical Section. They remained in Hiroshima until September 14, then surveyed Nagasaki from September 19 through October 8.

Nagasaki Survey Team

The dropping of the two atomic bombs raised many military and medical questions that would eventually lead to more nuclear tests, specifically Operation Crossroads.

US Strategic Bombing Survey

Concurrently with the Manhattan District’s survey teams, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey also conducted research on the effects of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This report (The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki), published on June 30, 1946, incorporated much of what was included in the Manhattan District’s report, but more from a “lessons learned” perspective as well as future implications for use of the atomic bomb on others or on the United States. The report’s somewhat convoluted conclusion regarding the use of the atomic bombs in influencing Japan’s surrender is that it created the excuse for them to accept the Potsdam terms while saving “face” — no army without the weapon could possibly resist an enemy who had it.